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Abstract 
REDD+ has been evolving since 2005, yet its outcomes and effectiveness in reducing deforestation 
and/or achieving co-benefits are still unclear. The academic literature has focused a great deal on the 
politics and performance of REDD+ recipient countries and on-the-ground implementation, but less so 
on REDD+ donor countries and not on the question of how REDD+ donor countries learn in the process 
of implementing REDD+. We examine the three major REDD+ donors Norway, Germany and the UK 
and find that their funding objectives and approaches have broadened from the original simple and 
focused idea of financially rewarding tropical forest countries to keep forests standing and carbon 
stored to land-use, co-benefits and global efforts of transformation. Modalities of learning have not 
kept up with the rapid changes in terms of problem definition and characterization (as ‘super wicked’), 
let alone the transformative organizational or even paradigmatic changes identified as needed. The 
experience with REDD+ is demonstrating that merely adjusting the system in incremental ways will 
likely not solve the problems at hand. Instead, novel modes of learning to facilitate such a transition 




Almost 15 years have passed since the idea of REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation 
and forest Degradation and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and 
enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries) was adopted by the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and local, regional, national, 
bilateral, transnational and international policies, programmes and projects emerged under 
the banner of REDD+ (Corbera and Schroeder 2011; Agrawal et al. 2011; Lederer 2012). In 
recognition of the role forests play in climate change, major donor countries around the world, 
in particular the top five of Norway, Germany, the US, Japan and the UK, have increased their 





Paris Agreement sent a strong signal in favor of REDD+ in dedicating one whole article (Article 
5) to the role of forests in addressing climate change (Korhonen-Kurki et al. 2018). 
 
REDD+ has led to some significant changes in discourses, practices, policies and legal 
frameworks across tropical forest countries since its inception in 2005 (Angelsen et al. 2012; 
Mulyani and Jepson 2013; Luttrell et al. 2014) and reshaped non-governmental engagement 
in the forest sector (Brockhaus et al. 2014; Gupta et al. 2016; Betts and Schroeder 2015). It 
has expanded from an initial idea of focusing on the carbon in the forest to realizing co-
benefits (Schroeder and McDermott 2014; Di Gregorio et al. 2013), recognizing the need to 
address deforestation drivers outside the forest (Curtis et al. 2018; van Hecken et al. 2019) 
and mitigating against justice-related pitfalls arising from REDD+ projects, such as 
displacement, marginalisation and loss of identity (Marion Suiseeya 2017). 
 
On the other hand, the largely neoliberal nature of REDD+ and its commodification of forest 
carbon have been critiqued repeatedly (McAfee 2016; Martin et al. 2019; Dunlap and Sullivan 
2019; Fletcher et al 2016; Osborne 2015) and have not been able to mitigate resource 
limitations, political instability, lack of political will, conflict over tenure rights and weak local 
governance and law enforcement (Lund et al. 2017; Dawson et al. 2018; Korhonen-Kurki 2019; 
Brockhaus et al. 2015). The significant dominance of donor countries in the process (Dooley 
and Parker 2015) and their reliance on development assistance goals and national interest 
(Gulrajani 2017) have led to repeated cases of oversimplified and generalized understanding 
of local level dynamics and complexities, leading to adverse outcomes and a tendency to not 
align project goals with local needs and relationships with their territory (Corbera and 
Schroeder 2017; Gebara and Agrawal 2017; Trædal and Vedeld 2017). Recognition of the 
ecological knowledge and practices of inhabitants of forests that have historically maintained 
the balance and wellbeing of these ecosystems remains insufficient (Schroeder and Gonzalez 
2019). 
 
Thus impacts from REDD+ vary greatly across geographies and scales (Angelsen et al. 2012; 
Mulyani and Jepson 2013; Luttrell et al. 2014) as well as on the evaluation or impact 
assessment method used (Bos et al. 2017). Studies touching on the performance of results-
based approaches have emerged in recent years (Arts et al. 2019; Wong et al. 2019; Angelsen 
et al. 2018; Duchelle et al. 2018; Chiroleu-Assouline et al. 2018). In-depth studies on the major 
REDD+ donor countries are especially scarce or now dated, although a few reports, articles 
and working papers exist (Westholm et al. 2011; Streck 2012; Pistorius and Kiff 2014; Dooley 
and Parker 2015; Norman and Nakhooda 2014; Well and Carrapatoso 2017). Yet, none of the 
studies has focused on processes and outcomes of policy learning within REDD+ decision 
making, despite the recognition of its importance for improving REDD+ outcomes and needing 
reflexive responses, rather than blueprint solutions. Hence, we ask: How do policymakers in 
REDD+ donor countries learn? and sub-questions of (1) What modes and types of learning are 
used? (2) What are the roles of scales of individual to institutional, generalist to specialist and 
incremental to transformative learning? (3) How deep is the learning? We examine the three 
major REDD+ donors Norway, Germany and the UK, which have jointly pledged USD 5 billion 
for 2015-2020 (for funding volumes see Atmadja et al 2018).  
 
The paper is structured as follows. We begin with summarizing how learning is conceptualized 





funding landscapes in Norway, Germany and the UK. We then introduce our conceptual 
framework and methods before analyzing the types, modes, scales and depth through which 
learning is practiced in the three countries. We end with a discussion and concluding remarks. 
 
 
2. Policy Learning  
 
It has long been acknowledged that learning matters in policymaking (e.g. Nye 1987; Haas and 
Haas 1995), in particular for tackling problems that are described as ‘super-wicked’, being 
highly urgent, uncertain, non-linear, untested, symptomatic of other problems, novel, ever 
evolving and lacking a central authority (Levin et al. 2012). Where problems are characterized 
in this way, as is the case with climate change and accelerating deforestation, special attention 
to learning about how to improve institutional configurations, intersections and instrument 
mixes (Cashore and Galloway 2010) and what types and modes of learning - or unlearning - 
are needed, is particularly vital. Whilst the policy learning literature has looked into various 
types of learning (Hall 1993; Zito and Schout 2009; Cashore et al. 2011; Heikkila and Gerlak 
2013), how exactly learning can help mitigate such intractable problems has remained vague.  
 
Throughout the literature, policy learning is referred to as a continuous response to feedback 
in a complex system, as acquisition of skills and knowledge, as the result of analysis and/or 
social interaction, or as detecting and correcting errors (Rietig 2019; Cashore et al. 2011; 
Radaelli 2009; Zito and Schout 2009). Dunlop and Radaelli describe policy learning as “the 
updating of beliefs based on lived or witnessed experiences, analysis or social interaction” 
(2013, 599). Others see learning as ‘meaning making’, i.e., the process by which people 
understand, construe or make sense of situations, events, objects, discourses, relationships 
or the self. People thus make sense of a given situation based on their history of similar 
situations, available cultural references or resources as well as identities and emotions (e.g. 
Bruner 1990; Kegan 1980). 
 
A policy learning process is thus shaped by the capacity of the organization or individual to 
assess the contribution of policies to desired outcomes and to organize feedback from these 
achievements into the policy system. Such an assessment could be based on modes of learning 
of: (1) experience (learning by doing and learning by using); (2) observation of others (learning 
by observing); (3) systematic study (learning by studying or learning); and (4) interaction 
(learning by interacting) (Kemp and Weehuizen 2005). Howlett et al. (2017) identifies three 
types of learning: cognitive/technical – instrumental learning about the nature of the problem, 
the assumptions on the causal relationships involved and the pros and cons of measures 
aimed to address the problem; social/political – actors learning about how to operate within 
a network setting and apply strategies aimed at collaboration and negotiation; and 
structural/institutional – development of shared and lasting arrangements, procedures, rules, 
norms, values and trust that reduces the risks and costs of interactions and supports 
negotiations and collaboration (Howlett et al. 2017).  
 
Whether learning processes can tackle ‘super-wicked’ problems will also depend on the depth 
in which learning takes place. Van der Steen and Groenewegen (2008) distinguish between 
first and second-order learning. First-order learning is one of ‘lesson drawing’ at a technical 





learning, address processes within governmental organizations and lead to organizational 
changes. It would likely take place more frequently in well-defined institutional frameworks 
and stable environments with clearly defined, transparent and stable rules and procedures 
and shared understanding of the actors involved. Second-order learning contributes to 
paradigmatic or transformative change at the level of the organization or system (Brockhaus 
et al. 2017). Such deep learning addresses goals, strategies and policy approaches and can 
lead to (radical) changes in policy paradigms. It thus touches on the core beliefs, fundamental 
designs, goals and activities of a system. This type of learning tends to involve a wider set of 
actors and is more likely to occur when there is a degree of instability in structures and tension 
or conflict between competing objectives, approaches or rules. Critical external events, 
scarcity of resources and emerging new fields or demands can provide the conditions that 
facilitate second-order learning. Hybrid variants are also quite common, such as what is 
understood as ‘step by step acceleration’ or ‘progressive incrementalism’ (e.g. Geels and 
Schot 2007). Thus, deep or transformative learning is needed for REDD+ because, first, climate 
action should be transformative in nature if it is going to be effective and, second, REDD+ faces 
substantial trade-offs, including conflicts between competing objectives as mentioned earlier, 
which makes deep learning necessary (Nair and Howlett 2017).  
 
Pahl-Wostl identifies multi-level learning processes as “social and societal learning that 
proceeds in a stepwise fashion moving from single to double to triple-loop learning” (Pahl-
Wostl 2009, 354). These three loops of learning, borrowed from organisational theory, 
represent distinct stages of effecting change. Single-loop learning represents a refining of 
actions to improve performance, but without changing guiding assumptions or calling into 
question established routines (doing things right). Double-loop learning represents a change 
in the frame of reference and/or the calling into question of guiding assumptions (doing the 
right thing). Triple-loop learning represents a transformation of the structural context and/or 
factors that determine the frame of reference (Pahl-Wostl 2009; Flood and Romm 1996). In 
other words, when characterizing the problem as structured (“high scientific and normative 
consensus”), a technological solution is sufficient (single loop). When it is characterized as 
moderately structured (“with creeping doubts about the science and norms needed to deal 
with it”), the solution is to question the underlying assumptions (double loop). When it is 
characterized as unstructured (“where there is a breakdown in normative consensus”) and as 
ideological or systemic, then what is needed is transformative learning or, indeed, 
“unlearning” (triple loop) (Gupta 2016: 192). 
 
That said, some suggest learning is in the ‘eye of the beholder’, in which case it is also not 
neutral, but is politically shaped (Radaelli 2009). Asymmetrical power, frictions, contestations, 
weakness in institutional resources and fights for control of resources have all been cited as 
sources of failure to learn in policy processes (Dunlop 2017). Finally, learning is not always a 
‘good’ thing, as indicated by the concept of dysfunctional learning (Dunlop and Radaelli 2016). 
 
 
3. Research Design and Methods 
 
To examine what is learned and how learning takes place in REDD+ donor countries to reach 
stated objectives on REDD+, we analyze primary/secondary literature and expert interview 





latter question to identify patterns that can be generalized and compared with other issue 
domains to facilitate future learning. Borrowing from Howlett et al. (2017) and Kemp and 
Weehuizen (2005), the learning matrix combines three levels with four modes of learning. The 
three levels of learning include: (1) cognitive/technical – about the technical nature of the 
problem, the assumptions on the causal relationships involved and the pros and cons of 
measures aimed to address the problem; (2) social/political – about the stakeholders, how to 
operate within a network setting and what collaboration and negotiation strategies work or 
not; and (3) structural/institutional – about the development of shared and lasting 
arrangements, procedures, rules, norms, values and trust that reduce the risks and costs of 
interactions and support negotiations and collaboration. The four modes of learning include: 
(1) study (learning); (2) observation (watching); (3) experience (doing); and (4) interaction 
(exchanging). Through this we derive insights into three scales of learning - individual to 
institutional, generalist to specialist and incremental to transformative. Finally, we link this 
approach to learning to notions of deep learning, including the three loops of learning (Pahl-
Wostl 2009) and learning as meaning making (Kegan 1980) through a process through which 
actors jointly develop meanings for critical ideas, and emerge as communities of purpose (Sato 
et al. 2018). This ensemble will help address the paper’s overall research question of How do 
policymakers in REDD+ donor countries learn? and sub-questions of (1) What modes and types 
of learning are used? (2) What are the roles of scales of individual to institutional, generalist 
to specialist and incremental to transformative learning? (3) How deep is the learning?  
 
This research involved 18 semi-structured, expert interviews to find out if and how policy 
learning on REDD+ design and implementation has taken place through study, observation, 
experience and interactions internally and externally to undertake or impact shifts cognitively, 
politically and institutionally deeply and meaningfully. Expert interviews were conducted over 
Skype or telephone during 2018-19. The experts were from the three donor country ministries 
and implementing agencies in-country and overseas (14), outside government (4), with one 
having moved from practice to academia, one from practice to the private sector and one 
academic having had experience being on a government delegation for UNFCCC meetings for 
several years. Interviewees were chosen through snowball sampling and recommendations 
until the most relevant experts had been identified, contacted and interviewed if a response 
was received (up to 50% in certain countries). Interviewees all have knowledge of and 
experience with the international REDD+ negotiation process, bilateral relations and/or 
implementation of REDD+-related policies and measures in recipient countries. Many have 
been involved with REDD+ and previous forest-related activities for a decade or longer, and 
have, over time, moved across ministries, agencies and embassies of their respective 
countries as well as international organizations.  
 
The qualitative data collection method based on small-n is preferred when significant 
research-based knowledge on the area in focus is weak and only a few people have expertise, 
experience and insights regarding the problem at hand. It allows the researcher to adapt new 
knowledge and encourage thick descriptions (Kvellheim 2017), i.e., descriptions that are not 
merely descriptive but also interpretive, not merely capturing detail but also context, 
therefore containing layers of subtle and rich meaning (Thompson 2001). Expert interviews 
allow for a documentation of knowledge that is otherwise not readily available. Interviews are 
continued until new arguments or insights cease to emerge, following the principle of 






The interviews were based on a semi-structured interview guide with mainly open-ended 
questions, with follow-up questions evolving throughout the interview process and depending 
on the expertise and experience of the interviewee. Questions addressed REDD+ finance 
(approach to REDD+ funding, objectives of funding, changes in objectives and approaches, 
reasons for these changes, challenges with results-based finance) and learning (how does 
learning take place - referring to levels, modes, scales and depth of learning, lessons easy to 
learn or not, lessons leading to changes in policy or funding or not). We settled on these partly 
inductively and partly deductively, starting with more general questions and in later 
interviews probing more with regard to the levels, modes, scales and depth of learning. Each 
interview lasted between 20 and 50 minutes and was either recorded and transcribed or 
written up during the interview. Interview partners are anonymized to enable confidentiality 
and avoid being able to trace any quote to a specific policymaker, practitioner or researcher 
interviewed. After the interviews were transcribed, they were analyzed using manual, open-
ended coding around the themes from the interview guide mentioned above and focused on 
finding patterns within or across (Corbin and Strauss 2014) and distilling information on 
shifting objectives and approaches as well as levels, modes, scales and depth of learning. The 
interviewees are referenced in the paper using a system of coding that conveys the country 
the respondent associates with (I-N for Norway; I-G for Germany; I-U for the UK), followed by 
a number that marks the order of interviews conducted, but does not convey the 
interviewee’s organization or identity (I-N1; I-N2; etc.). They were sent a draft version of this 
paper for comment before submission to this journal, which three of them took up. 
 
Norway, Germany and the UK were chosen as case study countries given their status as the 
three largest REDD+ funders, with Norway in the lead, and because of their alliance as GNU 
(short for Germany, Norway and the UK), meaning that exchange between them is frequent 
and institutionalized. They thus lend themselves well to tracing what levels and modes of 
learning are particularly common in the process of policy learning that results in an “updating 
of beliefs based on lived or witnessed experiences, analysis or social interaction” (Dunlop and 
Radaelli 2013, 599).  
 
 
4. The REDD+ Funding Landscape 
 
The original idea of REDD+ was that developed countries would financially incentivize 
developing countries with substantial forest cover to measurably reduce deforestation and 
thus forest carbon emissions beyond what would have occurred in its absence (UNFCCC 2011). 
Backed by scientific estimations that deforestation was accounting for some 17-20 percent of 
global greenhouse gas emissions (IPCC 2007) and economic projections that reducing 
deforestation was a cheap and effective mitigation option (Stern 2006; Eliasch 2008), REDD+ 
as a financial mechanism was included in the 2007 Bali Action Plan. The idea that public and 
private investors would fund REDD+ as an opportune form of climate mitigation and that 
REDD+ would respect sovereign authority by channeling payments through national 
governments was born (McDermott et al. 2012). 
 
Options for REDD+ incentives from the start included multilateral and bilateral public funding 





2008, the World Bank set up its Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) and the UN 
established its UN-REDD programme. Between them they have helped some 64 countries with 
funding to develop capacity and get ‘ready’ for REDD+. Norway, Germany and the UK 
established funding programmes to help developing countries set up reference levels and 
Measuring, Reporting and Verification (MRV) systems and design REDD+ national strategies. 
In addition, many conservation and development-oriented NGOs, alongside other 
proponents, have created REDD+ projects (or rebranded existing projects to fit with the 
REDD+ discourse) on the ground in many countries. Some developing countries have 
formulated their own approaches to REDD+, for example, Bolsa Floresta in Brazil and the 
Indigenous REDD Programme in Bolivia, and others have established their own funds, such as 
the Amazon Fund in Brazil (Well and Carrapatoso 2017; Sills et al. 2014). 
 
Multiple challenges facing REDD+ broadened its remit to miscellaneously addressing 
additional objectives, including poverty reduction, livelihood improvement, biodiversity 
conservation, adaptation, indigenous rights and good governance (Vijge et al. 2016). This has 
greatly impacted the evolving funding landscape. The domestic policy focus has shifted from 
payments for environmental services (PES) to broader policy realignments and shifts in 
incentive structures, suggesting change of a transformational nature is required (Brockhaus 
et al. 2017; Mulyani and Jepson 2013). Large-scale market funding has not materialized due 
to the failure to establish a global carbon market that integrates REDD+ credits (Angelsen 
2017). 
 
To operationalise the evolving REDD+ mechanism and results-based payments, the 2010 
UNFCCC Cancun Agreement (UNFCCC 2010) adopted a phased approach with distinct but 
overlapping phases: (1) readiness and capacity building; (2) policy reforms and national REDD+ 
strategies; and (3) payments based on verified/certified emission reductions. The feasibility of 
a Phase 3 is controversial; on the one hand, its underlying idea and desirability are questioned, 
on the other, there is concern that many countries might never graduate to Phase 3 (Angelsen 
2017). Indeed, it comes with increasingly ambitious and “transparent” conditions, including 
having an ambitious national REDD+ strategy to demonstrate their “long-term perspectives or 
goals” and an MRV system in place. Countries now also increasingly “have to provide 
quantifiable targets for forests in their NDCs to be able to receive funds” (I-G2). Countries are 
thus unlikely to receive funds for ‘accidental’ deforestation rate reductions, such as resulting 
from a recession.  
 
In an attempt to work together to strengthen coordination among major donors to achieve 
the goals set in the 2014 New York Declaration on Forests and the 2015 Paris Agreement, 
Germany, Norway and the UK formed a partnership in 2014, named ‘GNU’. In joint statements 
they have expressed strong support for ambitious, credible action to address deforestation 
and promote forest restoration, including through providing results-based finance for REDD+ 
(Stumpf et al. 2018). This would be achieved through scaled up finance (aiming for over USD 
5 billion in the period 2015-2020), a focus on strengthening existing and creating new 
partnerships with tropical forest countries such as Colombia, supporting civil society and 
indigenous peoples and working with the private and financial sectors to transform supply 
chains. The partnership is institutionally supported by a secretariat located in the German 
Federal Ministry for Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU) and holds 





(I-U2). Whilst this has facilitated a great amount of exchange among the three countries, they 
have to work within their respective accountability frameworks and budgets that differ from 
one another. They each have their budgets and annual spending commitments and finance 
targets that they need to fulfill. Those obligations mean that “it is not always easy to align 
everything that the three donors do”. But over time they have “acquired a volume of  
knowledge and experience about what works” (I-U1). This is where learning that involves 





Norway emerged as a major donor for REDD+ through Prime Minister Stoltenberg’s pledge in 
2007 of some 3 billion USD annually to the global deforestation effort. Norway pledged up to 
1 billion USD to Brazil in 2008 and to Indonesia in 2010, if results in reducing emissions from 
deforestation and forest degradation were achieved, following Indonesia’s announcement of 
its willingness to make substantial cuts to its deforestation rate. Some commentators see an 
opportunity to further cement its role as a major aid donor, promoter of global peace and 
prosperity and a ‘moral superpower’ behind Norway’s move to become the largest REDD+ 
donor country. REDD+ seemed like an attractive opportunity to contribute to solving a global 
problem with moderate financial input, which other countries would match or exceed 
(McNeill 2015; Hermansen 2015). Support has been strong from most political parties in 
Norway's parliament to commit a total of one billion US dollars a year to REDD+ (Hermansen 
and Kasa 2014). 
 
The primary agent behind Norway’s commitment to reducing deforestation is the Ministry of 
Climate and Environment. However, policy and operational responsibility for international aid 
and development is consolidated in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). Most Norwegian 
development cooperation is administered through the MFA and its embassies. The MFA 
oversees three agencies that also administer Norwegian ODA, including the Norwegian 
Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) (Gulrajani 2017). The Norwegian International 
Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI), created in 2007-08, is a section in the Climate 
Department of the Ministry of Climate and Environment and, with a staff of about 20, holds 
technical responsibility for its international REDD+ engagement. 
 
Several members of the NICFI team are stationed in embassies in key REDD+ partner countries 
(Indonesia, Brazil, Congo, Ethiopia, Colombia and Peru). Norway has established results-based 
partnerships with Brazil, Indonesia, Tanzania, Guyana, Colombia, Peru, Liberia, Congo and 
Ethiopia and may have contributed to 20 million tons of emissions reductions overseas by 
2016, equaling 40 percent of Norway’s annual emissions (Hein et al. 2018). Norway’s funding 




Germany has a long history of engagement in forestry science and silviculture, having also 
been active in various forms of international cooperation on forests and supporting 
developing countries in protecting forest resources for many decades. German scholarship in 





till today economic ambitions and understandings of rentability in forest plantations, e.g. 
based on mono-cultures and clearcutting, not always at ease with ecological objectives.  Its 
own land use change experience as a densely populated country, its success in reversing 
detrimental land use practices and its high level of awareness around the importance of 
healthy forests have also shaped its long-lasting commitment to international forest 
conservation and sustainable management (Pistorius and Kiff 2014).  
 
The main ministries that deal with REDD+ are the BMU and the Federal Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (BMZ). They are assisted by two implementing bodies, the 
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) (technical advice and 
expertise) and the KfW Development Bank (financial advice and expertise). The BMU houses 
the German International Climate Initiative (ICI), set up in 2008 to support a variety of 
activities and research, including on global forest governance. 
 
REDD+ fits well into the emerging sustainable development paradigm (I-G3), as some would 
argue, with performance-based payments giving recipient countries more responsibility and 
thus move beyond traditional ex-ante conditionality (Birdsall et al. 2014). Others fear 
Germany’s REDD+ investments have been distracting finance from other more effective forest 
protection approaches, reason for a number of parliamentary ‘requests’ (‘kleine Anfragen’) 
for clarification. Overall, Germany has pursued a broader agenda that includes related aspects 
of development and both a more holistic, long-term perspective and a narrower focus on 
mitigation and emphasis on results with more short-term outputs. Elements of its approach 
include increased traditional bilateral development cooperation in the land sector, the Bonn 
Challenge as a global effort in forest landscape restoration, multilateral support and the 
REDD+ Early Movers Programme (REM) established in 2012 as an interim mechanism to test 
the results-based payments approach to reduce deforestation during Phase 3. REM has been 
a key element of Germany’s bilateral approach. Implemented jointly by KfW and GIZ and 
commissioned by BMZ, REM rewards pioneers of forest protection and then provides 




The UK’s approach to REDD+ is broader than that of Norway or Germany, and activities have 
traditionally focused on governance and legality, in particular through FLEGT (Dooley and 
Parker 2015). Climate finance is shared across the Department for International Development 
(DfID), the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) and the Department 
for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA). Each of their mandates in relation to 
international forest finance is based on their different experiences. The inter-departmental 
International Climate Fund (ICF), created in 2010, is the UK’s primary vehicle for forest finance. 
One specific priority is to drive innovation and new ideas for action and to create partnerships 
with the private sector. It has a strong evaluation and learning team involved in all its activities 
(I-U2). As the host of the next climate talks in Glasgow, the UK aims to position itself further 
as a leader in a coalition of nations supporting action against illegal timber trade and 
deforestation (Harvey 2020). 
 
In terms of specific priorities across the main departments, DfID promotes sustainable 





been the sole department historically in this area and thus has the most expertise in project 
implementation. DfID’s focus is on funding countries with weak institutions needing capacity 
and governance reform, which often coincides with increases of forest loss over time (Dooley 
and Parker 2015). DEFRA has significant experience in national forest and biodiversity 
conservation, though not in the tropics. Its focus is on addressing “structural problems and 
through that change the underlying governance” to influence and measure forest outcomes 
(I-U4). BEIS focuses on climate mitigation impacts and reduced carbon emissions, including 
from forests/land use. It has had a lot of experience in the international climate change and 
REDD+ negotiations, but less experience with tropical forest conservation. It mainly targets 
middle-income countries with more robust governance structures in place and thus a greater 
chance of reducing deforestation in the short term (Dooley and Parker 2015). It also runs 
Partnerships for Forests, which is a business incubation programme working with sustainable 
forest enterprises and is initially operational in Brazil and Colombia (I-U2).  
 
 
5. What is Learned: Shifting Objectives and Approaches to REDD+ Funding 
 
Across the landscape of key European donors, a general policy shift from narrow to broad, 
from focused to multiple and from directed to interactive has gradually emerged in response 
to challenges with regard to governing and implementing REDD+ (Corbera and Schroeder 
2011). REDD+ “has become a shorthand for a more expanded version of what it was meant to 
be” (I-N5). This shift includes the broadening from forests to land use, from carbon to co-
benefits and from focusing on forests and forest lands to engaging with the whole economy 
and country, including with multiple forest stakeholders and actors in the supply chain. This 
repositioning is also better in line with aid based funding, which has to fulfill ODA priorities. 
This broadening of scope is subsequently making it harder for donor countries to demonstrate 
results and impacts from investments (I-U5). 
 
5.1 Shifting Objectives 
 
Whilst donor countries remain committed to the preservation of natural forests, emissions 
reductions and REDD+, there is a shift in emphasis on these being long-term goals, perhaps 
aspirations, in many tropical forest countries. Given that the kind of transformation required 
to reduce deforestation is taking so much longer, and is so much more complex than originally 
anticipated, the evolved objective has become to support a “transition of the economy” 
through a broader approach that focuses not just on forests but also on land use given that 
agriculture is the main driver of deforestation (I-N4). In other words, “what it would take to 
arrest deforestation has remained more or less the same but the emphasis has changed over 
time” (I-N2). REDD+ is now “one of several tools in the toolbox” (I-N3).  
 
REDD+ has thus, for the most part, merged back from being singled out “as its own thing” into 
the broader development aid agenda around forest and biodiversity governance 
transformation (I-U3), and from exclusive emission reduction goals to pursuing co-benefits. 
Enhanced donor coordination has also become more crucial in the process and the learning 
arising from it, in particular through GNU in this case (Well and Carrapatoso 2017; Gupta et 
al. 2016; Westholm et al. 2011; Davis and Daviet 2010). A subtle shift has been noted from 





it becoming a policy objective in its own right within a broader set of international 
development objectives (I-N4; I-U2; I-G2). The contextual shift is that many major 
deforestation countries such as Brazil and Indonesia have seen - “the REDD+ process as a way 
to bring forward also domestic or national aspirations”, having committed their NDCs and now 
using “these REDD+ discussions to support their climate change goals in all their complexity 
and difficulty” (I-G6).  
 
5.2 Shifting Approaches 
 
There is growing recognition of the evolving multi-level REDD+ governance setting. At the 
international level, in addition to the multilateral funding approaches, including the WB-FCPF 
and the GCF, there are now the Paris Agreement and NDCs as well as Agenda 2030 and its 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to also report on, so policies and approaches need to 
reflect a broader set of objectives (I-N3). Transnationally, there are engagements with big 
business, global supply chains and big finance, for example around sustainable investments, 
including sustainable agriculture. Nationally, there are investments in diplomacy and bilateral 
partnerships. Sub-nationally, there is engagement with communities, civil society, public 
opinion and indigenous groups. Also, there is a widening from a results-based payment focus 
to employing multiple approaches and working with multiple stakeholders (Corbera and 
Schroeder 2017). 
 
Results-based payments have been, to varying degrees across countries, placed alongside 
other approaches to achieving the broader objective of forest and biodiversity governance 
transformation. It remains particularly key in Norway, fairly key in Germany and somewhat 
key in the UK. The reasons lie in the different institutional and political setups of the three 
countries. Norway emphasizes the “unique situation that we had a dedicated mandate and 
focus with significant budget that allowed us to … think a little bit from scratch and have a 
long-term view on how we would operate with countries” (I-N2). Yet, at the same time, 
Norway has been broadening its approach to identifying “who can make the transformational 
change in the country and then support those forces” (I-N3). This holds true also for Germany 
which continues to support results-based payments, whilst also finding “other ways to support 
countries, like helping them implement activities, build capacity” and supporting supply 
chains, indigenous peoples as landowners and procurement policies (I-G2). And the UK has 
also learned and adapted their approach along the way and increased their capacity to engage 
with more initiatives, acknowledging the “need to test a number of things” (I-U2).  
 
Getting to Phase 3 of results is indeed challenging for countries as they often have difficulties 
to implement policies and measures (Phase 2). But even if they deliver verifiable results, it can 
be difficult to receive payments without being able to “demonstrate their ambition and long-
term perspectives or goals” and “to provide quantifiable targets for forests in their NDCs” (I-
G2). In early 2019, Brazil was the first country to receive approval for results-based payments 
from the Green Climate Fund (GCF). This is somewhat curious given that since 2015 emissions 
have increased again, which begs the question of how the GCF treats permanence. In 
Indonesia, ‘readiness’ under the GCF was postponed several times, being only the latest of a 
number of readiness projections Indonesia has not achieved. It may be ready to receive 






Bilateral collaborations have been more difficult to carry out than anticipated, both for 
political and technical reasons. Politically, REDD+ has been going “very deep into the structure 
of the economy and going against traditional ways of managing the land. And there are always 
forces siding against it, even if the government is willing” (I-N4). There has been a decisive 
focus on quality of engagements after realizing that “it needs a deeper and longer and more 
sustainable kind of engagement … on the ground” (I-N4) and that “it is a trust process” (I-G6). 
This has led all three countries to increase presence by deploying additional staff in key forest 
countries, so there is “not just an email but an actual person” (I-N1; I-G1; I-U2). This proved 
effective in strengthening day-to-day exchange and better mutual understanding of 
expectations and challenges, even if staff leaving the embassy again after 3-4 years makes it 
difficult for them “to get a grasp on what’s been happening in the REDD+ sphere” in country 
(I-U6). Communication and trust needs to be reestablished with every change in government 
or senior personnel (I-N4). Technically, challenges have occurred around reference levels, 
inflated baselines, MRV and the realization that performance-based approaches do not work 
in all countries (I-N1; I-U3), given the need to tick all boxes of capacity and readiness. Such 
challenges in donor-recipient country relations and dynamics (for detailed examples, see 
Bulkan 2014 and Laing 2018) have led to a relationship characterized as “we trust but verify” 
(I-N4). 
 
Alongside the various bilateral engagements, all three donor countries also invest into a 
number of multilateral funds, including the WB-FCPF as the primary fund for results-based 
payments, the BioCarbon Fund and its Initiatives for Sustainable Forest Landscapes (I-G2). The 
REDD+ Early Movers scheme might be a way of breaking out of the “REDD+ fatigue” by 
mitigating the over-bureaucratization of the aid process, for example (I-G5).  
 
In all three countries, there has been a shift toward working a lot more closely with non-state 
and private actors. For example, in Norway there has been a move away from a purely REDD+ 
focus to one on “more direct collaboration with the business sector to adopt zero 
deforestation commitments” alongside “bilateral partnerships that reward countries for 
results” (I-N2). Norway “knew that the funding we have available was not enough to pay for 
the opportunity costs” given “there wouldn’t be more international funding forthcoming. So, 
we have to be more strategic and we need to identify who can make the transformational 
changes in the country and then support those forces” (I-N3). Norway now focuses on more 
direct collaboration with the business sector to put pressure on companies to adopt zero 
deforestation commitments and help transform global supply chains (I-N2). Norway now also 
pursues a green economy approach, environmental crime through INTERPOL and supports 
indigenous communities (I-N5; I-N2). Similar engagement is carried out through ICI, BMZ and 
German aid in general in Germany and the ICF in the UK. 
 
 
6. How it is Learned: Underlying Levels and Modes of Learning 
 
The broadening of REDD+ from a rather simple and focused idea to including additional 
elements, such as safeguards, co-benefits and Indigenous Peoples rights (McDermott et al. 
2012), has slowed down progress and made it harder to demonstrate results (I-U5), putting it 
“in the category of very hard to assess” (I-N2). Curiously, whilst “our means of electronically 





from it and identifying essences and key learnings is as difficult as it has always been” (I-U5). 
Learning is made even more difficult by the structural challenges of ever-changing political 
priorities and ever-changing civil service staff (I-U5), as well as the generally “busy schedules, 
vested interests” and that “everyone is always more interested in the next project than the 
last one”, thus “learning is always subordinated to new work” (I-U5). And the learning that is 
achieved at closer-to-the-ground levels and subsequently fed up in the bureaucratic system is 
often diluted at higher political levels. There, it depends on whatever party, minister, political 
leadership is there at a specific time and how they wish to process this information” (I-N6). 
Learning is thus riddled with difficulties, and interviewees acknowledge that “donors don’t 
have a good record of learning” (I-U5) and that “learning is slow” (I-G5) and “not very rigorous” 
(I-N1). Given these challenges, what modes of learning work best and at what level does 
learning take place? We examine here the modes of study, observation, experience and 
interaction and cognitive/technical, social/political and structural/institutional levels.  
 
All three countries emphasize the value of interaction facilitated by the GNU partnership 
between Germany, Norway and the UK. The dynamic of alignment and differentiation across 
the three countries is an opportunity for trying out different approaches to this ‘super-wicked’ 
novel challenge. Norway benefits from a “tightly knit” and “agile” team at NICFI focused solely 
on climate and forests, where “thinking happens collectively” and where decisions can at 
times be taken quickly given their “bigger freedom and less bureaucracy above” and “very 
good access to” their minister, but where there is also a greater risk of “tunnel vision” (I-N6). 
The learning that the Norwegians have achieved through their results-based payments 
approach embedded in its much larger financial support, has benefitted Germany and the UK 
through observation of how it has unfolded. Whilst describing it as a “courageous and bold 
approach” (I-G3), Germany sees its own role more in a broader approach, stemming from its 
long-standing engagement in international forest cooperation that is supported by the 
expertise of its two implementing agencies – GIZ and KfW – to offer not primarily financial 
support but to give political and technical support, strengthen macroeconomic conditions and 
civil society engagement (I-G3). But this setup can also result in difficulty to present a unified 
front to GNU partners. Norway and Germany have budgets and annual spending 
commitments, whilst the UK has an international climate finance target (I-U1). The UK also 
brings “evidence-based approaches” (I-G4) and “knowledge, a business case approach and aid 
effectiveness” through their particular institutional, administrative and political approach to 
REDD+ finance. But it has suffered the most from lack of continuity and gives REDD+ a lower 
place in its overall agenda. In all, “GNU has benefitted from our differences” (I-G3) and been 
“a really powerful  learning place” (I-U2). 
 
Norway has had a number of assessments of its bilateral partnerships. Also, each project that 
is approved by Norway has to put forward its results framework of indicators, outputs and 
outcomes. It also commissions real-time evaluations of NICFI, which periodically offers overall 
feedback on the work it does. Some projects have a goal not just to deliver impact, but to 
learn (I-N2). However, most learning is informal, and “by the time we get the evaluations, 
sometimes you learn something new, otherwise it confirms what you already know” (I-N2). 
However, the evaluations are also used “in strategic ways when we know something is not 
going exactly the way we wanted it to go”. This can then justify a change in direction (I-N3). 
When acting on what needs changing is difficult, “then we need to work with more actors who 





academic, less rigorous experiences that you do in working with partners” (I-N2) as well as 
“learning through dialogue, learning by doing” (I-N4). Norway has “a lot of radar functions 
through our networks and various partnerships and programmes. It gives us a continuous feed 
of input” for annual strategy review (I-N4).  
 
Experience is a key mode of learning for Germany’s implementing agencies in the sense that 
much learning is about how to operationalize goals and approaches, focusing on the 
instrumental mechanisms that will be most effective, efficient and equitable (I-G4). In the 
BMU, learning and evaluation happens through systems of biannual reports and knowledge 
management. Feedback from the implementing organization and their on-the-ground links is 
fed in and systematized for learning. Exchange is deemed crucial and happens both 
individually and organizationally through UNFCCC conferences, other international 
conferences and targeted support through science institutions like CIFOR. The BMU has also 
made attempts to have a monitoring system in place to allow for a more systematic approach 
to aggregate information from a project. This comes with trade-offs between depth of 
information and systematization and practicability of inputting and using that amount of 
information for meaningful evaluations. The BMU has had two evaluation cycles, evaluating 
at project, sectoral and overall funding structure levels, and when deciding on a new funding 
cycle this type of information is considered (I-G3). ICI is used to fill gaps on what has not been 
done yet and support innovative approaches (I-G3).  
 
For the UK, first-hand experience and direct interaction are the most common ways of 
learning, whilst study and observation are secondary (I-U1). Formal learning is embedded in 
requirements for specific monitoring, evaluating and learning with mid-term and final 
evaluations as part of any investment. Impact studies and baselining at the beginning of an 
initiative with a view to being able “to really measure” are also common (I-U2). It is noted that 
in formal evaluation “they tell you things you already know. We need more real time learning, 
as things progress”. Learning takes place through individuals and teams involved in 
programmes, which can be “hard to capture and share with the wider organization. It is 
attempted through mechanisms such as seminars, professional retreats, professionals 
meetings once a year to exchange learning” (I-U5). Practical field experiences have slowly 
eroded over the past ten years as “increasingly they outsource”. And “when they don’t do the 
work themselves the opportunities for learning are lost. It is the case in DfID and more so in 
DEFRA and DECC that people are taken on on a 3-year basis” (I-U5).  
 
The level of individual learning is often high. Bureaucrats “obtain knowledge and have our 
finger on the pulse of what is going on in the forests space through research and dialogue and 
day to day work” (I-N6). Organizational/institutional learning is to some extent at least 
dependent on whether or not there is a lot of turn-over in the ministries and agencies. In the 
case of Norway and Germany in particular there is a good level of institutional memory, with 
many key people having worked in the sector (including in forest management or land use 
change before REDD+ emerged) for a long time. In those cases, a key element of learning 
occurs at the individual level, as “a lot of it is also tacit knowledge that people like me generate 
over the years by working in this sector for quite some time” (I-G3). 
 
Study, i.e. the use of written documentation, tends to be less common. This is, at least to some 





bandwidth to monitor everything that comes out” (I-N2). Studies are at times used as formal 
evidence for justifying a policy change. For example, interviewees report that the findings 
from meta-studies on the effectiveness of Indigenous research have strengthened their 
“ability to promote that” (I-N2).  
 
Learning about the nature of the problem, the assumptions on the causal relationships 
involved and the pros and cons of measures aimed to address the problem, i.e. the 
cognitive/technical level, happens for all three countries through UNFCCC and other such 
meetings, but also reports and, to some extent, academic literature. Science institutions such 
as CIFOR and the Centre for Global Development (CGD) are mentioned as go-to places. The 
UK mentions observation as a key mode of cognitive/technical learning, whilst the learning 
mode of experience is key for Germany and Norway; this is through long-term experience in 
the forestry sector and implementing agencies in the case of Germany and through learning 
by trial and error in the case of Norway. All countries report that they benefit from interaction 
through ongoing in-person exchange. 
Learning about how to operate within a network setting and apply strategies aimed at 
collaboration and negotiation, i.e. the social/political level, happens primarily through 
observation, experience and interaction. Whilst the UNFCCC and GNU meetings are key 
moments of interaction and observation for all three countries, the radar function that 
networks, partnerships and programmes offer serve to feed directly into annual strategy 
reviews and decisions in Norway in particular. Tacit knowledge gained from years of 
experience is particularly important for Germany and Norway (I-G3, I-N5). Study occurs in the 
UK also through requirements set for monitoring, evaluation and learning through mid-term 
and final evaluations (I-U2). 
Learning about the development of shared and lasting arrangements, procedures, rules, 
norms, values and trust that reduces the risks and costs of interactions and supports 
negotiations and collaboration, i.e. structural/institutional learning, features study more so 
than learning at other levels (Di Gregorio et al. 2017). Here, assessments of bilateral 
partnerships (Norway) and systems of biannual reports and knowledge management 
(Germany) function as key modalities of learning. GNU members play specific and 
complementary roles within the partnership, which allows for learning through observation 
and interaction. How to operationalize goals and approaches in the context of REDD+, on the 
other hand, happens primarily through on-the-ground, face-to-face experience (Mawdsley et 
al. 2005), highlighted in particular by Germany. Table 1 and Figure 1 below provide an 
overview of the underlying modes and levels of learning. 
Table 1: What and how learning takes place in Norway (N), Germany (G) and the UK (U), 
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science institutions like 
CIFOR (All+); 
Systematic approach to 
aggregate information 
from projects (G+); 
In-country presence 
through reps in 
embassies (N++, U+); 
Learning from Norway 
about RBF (G+, U+); 
Staff with long-term 
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Through 
implementing 
agencies GIZ and KfW 
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How to operationalize 




























7. Discussion: Modes, types and resulting scales and depth of learning 
 
In terms of modes and types of learning, the analysis above shows that learning in REDD+ 
donor countries takes place primarily through experience and interaction, somewhat through 
observation and less so through study. Whilst learning happens to a large extent in an informal 
manner, the formalized and intermittent processes of evaluation and reporting are not 
deemed quite as useful in all cases. On-the-ground learning in recipient countries is obviously 
useful, and all countries have some provisions for this, with Germany in the form of specialized 
implementing agencies (GIZ and KfW) and Norway and the UK with staff in key forest country 
embassies. Learning is made even more difficult, of course, in a context of changing political 
priorities and vested interests, and especially given the often highly political nature of the 
process (I-G6). This is where tacit knowledge acquired over time (Polanyi 1967) has played a 
key, perhaps underappreciated, role. 
In terms of the scale of individual to institutional learning, one interviewee suggested that 
barriers in the REDD+ process might have been identified sooner had there been more 
rigorous monitoring and evaluation from the get-go to facilitate learning (I-U5). Some 
interviewees report that there is a need to facilitate translating individual learning into 
institutional learning and on-the-ground learning into learning at the political level, perhaps 
through more frequent high-level learning events (I-U5, I-G4). What is needed is finding better 
avenues for communicating or sharing experience. And, given the nature of ‘super-wicked’ 
problems, ‘deeper’ approaches to learning such as (self-)reflection and future visioning 





measuring and evaluation checklists, could be much more explicitly budgeted for in any 
project or programme. Also, if individual learning is more wide-spread and institutional 
memory thus weaker, collecting feedback from outcomes on the ground could be collected 
more systematically and fed more formally into decision-making processes at a higher level to 
effect change more quickly, rather than wait until a mid-term or end point of a funding cycle 
or when preparing a new one. Yet, there is a risk that formalisation of knowledge might 
degrade the quality and value of the tacit learning. 
In terms of the scale of generalists to specialist learning, specialists are deeply engaged and 
do not easily see the bigger picture and connections with other issues, whilst generalists lack 
the understanding and longitudinal engagement to identify key policy implications (I-U5). 
Germany is perhaps closest to the specialist model given its implementing agencies’ significant 
on-the-ground expertise and experience, whilst the UK approach is the most generalist of the 
three given its broader engagement that includes governance and legality angles and more 
frequent turn-over. The latter makes learning based on personal experience more difficult, 
and thus “the UK has much more systematic criteria of making sure that lessons learned are 
collected” (I-G4).  
In terms of the scale of incremental to transformative learning, when to adjust by increment 
and when to abort a process completely, knowing that “it takes quite a lot to get it operating? 
Making changes may change the mandate of the fund and the governance around it, making 
it more difficult to implement learning” (I-U1). Is the learning apparatus able to make such a 
call when needed? Our research suggests that the REDD+ donor learning apparatus is not 
entirely prepared, which means that there are limits in all countries, despite their different 
strengths and weaknesses at individual country and domain levels due to the diverse 
structures, experiences and criteria applied. That said, efforts are made, such as through 
DEVAL, a new research centre in Germany that is currently preparing an evaluation of 
Germany REDD+ funding (for which two of us have been interviewed). Furthermore, despite 
efforts in collaborative learning through GNU, the way they complement each other and their 
efforts in advancing learning as a group, REDD+ would still require learning at the level of 
transformational change needed to halt deforestation.  
In term of depth of learning (Kemp and Weehuizen 2005; van der Steen and Groenewegen 
2008; Pahl-Wostl 2009), it can be argued that whilst ‘lesson drawing’ at a technical level and 
internal learning resulting in organizational changes (first-order learning) has certainly been 
achieved, learning leading to paradigmatic or transformative change at the level of the 
organization or system (second-order learning) has not. Likewise, refining of actions to 
improve performance (single-loop learning) has been achieved, such as a gradual shift to 
broader sets of objectives and approaches. Calling into question guiding assumptions (double-
loop learning), or transforming the structural context (triple-loop learning), have perhaps not 
(yet) been outrightly achieved, as otherwise ongoing challenges referred to earlier would have 
been solved. That said, the broadening of REDD+ and putting it into a more holistic policy 
context, rather than treating forests as an isolated policy arena is an example of some more 
meta-cognitive change, even if it might have been more of an evolution than a decision. One 
can argue that a sustainable world already exists underneath the superficial consumerism and 
ego-centrism that has resulted in the rampant deforestation REDD+ is trying to address, such 
as in some indigenous communities. Moreover, given the evidence from the literature that 





the difficulties identified in earlier decades with conservation and development projects in 
forested landscapes (Chomba et al. 2016, Lund et al. 2017, Redford 2013), there seems to be 
major barriers to transformative learning. 
Thus, for super-wicked problems such as deforestation, where these deep underlying causes 
and contexts have to be taken into account, solutions will need to incorporate elements of 
relearning and unlearning. This should start in the donor countries themselves, where 
underlying ideologies, lifestyles and production and consumption patterns need to be 
questioned, including whether the growth paradigm and its continual demand for more goods 
and services, free trade and investment patterns are consistent with addressing super-wicked 
problems (Gupta 2016). Thus, a problem seen as a low-hanging fruit some 15 years ago 
actually fits with the definitions of super-wicked. It is time to call out this cognitive dissonance, 
to develop matching learning approaches and policy responses, in particular at the political 
level, and to uphold a common purpose (Sato et al. 2018) around preserving the world’s 




The historical, institutional, organizational, operational and political approaches of Norway, 
Germany and the UK vary in crucial ways and have generated different kinds of lessons over 
the past 10+ years. Whilst experience with the forest and land use sectors more broadly is 
longer standing in Germany and the UK, Norway entered with the emergence of REDD+. 
Norway’s financial commitment has been higher from the get-go and focused more squarely 
on carbon emission reductions than the other two countries, where REDD+ fits within a wider 
portfolio of activities related to the forestry sector. Germany brings on-the-ground political 
and technical knowledge, whilst the UK brings the highest level of pragmatism through aid 
effectiveness and a business case approach to the GNU partnership. Individual level learning 
takes place with certain individuals either having worked in the same position for a long time 
or moved across different organizations working on REDD+. The UK has seen a little more 
cross-fertilization with a mix of long-standing and newer people working on REDD+. Study and 
experience feature more strongly in Norway and Germany than the UK, the latter working off 
of observation and exchange more readily. The differences can be distilled as Norway making 
the strongest financial and political contribution to REDD+ at political/social and 
institutional/structural levels, Germany the strongest systematic and technical contributions 
at cognitive/technical and social/political levels and the UK the strongest pragmatic and 
analytical contributions at cognitive/technical and social/political levels. 
 
The dominant role of results-based finance has given way to a more pluralistic and versatile 
approach, and tropical forest countries have, since the 2015 Paris Agreement, to varying 
degrees, incorporated their own approaches into their NDCs. This certainly offers the 
opportunity to focus more on the changing forest and land-use dynamics and the broader 
global discourses and agendas around sustainable development in which to embed more 
holistic, integrated sustainable forest and land use management approaches. It is clear now 
that financial incentives alone will not suffice; rather, what is needed much more are 
interventions and investments in private and societal actors’ capability and legitimacy to be 





et al. 2018), and learning modalities that are more transformative than those based on study, 
observation, experience and interaction. Hence, in order to reduce emissions from 
deforestation and forest degradation, we need to overcome their drivers, and they may well 
not only lie in what we consume, but also in how we, or donor countries here, are willing to 
learn. Whilst established learning techniques such as study, observation, experience and 
interaction can be put to revolutionary use, as REDD+ in the early days has perhaps done, 
revolutionizing learning by acquiring new techniques would be another way forward, and as 
the current reality of ongoing deforestation indicates, a revolution is needed. Just like REDD+ 
and results-based payments were “an experiment … a new approach … trial and error” (I-G5), 
we could dare to be more revolutionary with regard to learning as well.  
 
The experience with REDD+ is demonstrating that merely adjusting the system in incremental 
ways will likely not solve the problem at hand. Instead, we may come to a point where we 
accept that the system will have to drastically change. Some more conventional alternative 
approaches already exist, such as the green economy, inclusive growth and inclusive 
development, integrating elements of social wellbeing, environmental protection and 
countering power politics (Gupta 2016). In addition, some more radical ones are also being 
discussed, such as degrowth and the steady state economy (Kerschner 2010). But we may 
need to go further to employ novel modes of learning to facilitate such a transition. These 
might include learning through engaging with emotions such as grief, self-reflection, active 
listening, mindfulness, deconditioning, deep enquiry into why we consume and eat the way 
we do, transpersonal experiences and immersion into nature (Durnová 2019; Durnová 2018; 
Ahall 2018). They may sound radical, perhaps even disruptive, and if so, they are likely the 
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